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A RETURN TO STATE SOVEREIGN1Y: HOW INDIVIDUALS WITH 
DISABILITIES IN MARYLAND MAY STILL SEEK RELIEF AGAINST 
STATE EMPLOYERS AFTER BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVER-
SITY OF ALABAMA v. GARRETT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At the foundation of the American political system lies a 
government of dual sovereigns: federal and state. 1 Two of the 
Founding Fathers, Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, 
understood when writing the Constitution that the nation would 
sometimes require federal supremacy, but they never believed that the 
states relinquished all of their sovereignty upon joining the Union.2 
This concept of federalism survived the American Revolution, and in 
1793, the government adopted the Eleventh Amendment,3 which 
purported to offer the states some protection from a domineering 
federal government.4 However, these safeguards did not stop the 
courts and Congress from abandoning a system of duel sovereignty in 
favor of a federally dominated nation.5 
Today, federalism e~oys a rebirth. 6 Recent United States Supreme 
Court decisions demonstrate a trend towards taking power away from 
Congress and giving it back to the states. 7 In doing so, the Court has 
1. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991) ("As every schoolchild 
learns, our Constitution established a system of duel sovereignty between 
the States and the Federal government."). 
2. See THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 198 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961) ("But as the plan of the convention aims only at a partial union 
or consolidation, the State governments would clearly retain all the rights 
of sovereignty which they had before, and which by the act, exclusively 
delegated to the United States."); THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (James Madison) 
("[Tjhe State governments could have little to apprehend, because it is 
only within a certain sphere that the federal power can, in the nature of 
things, be advantageously administered."). 
3. U.S. CoNST. amend. XI ("The Judicial Power of the United States shall not 
be constructed to extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or 
prosecuted against any one of the United States by Citizens of another 
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."). 
4. /d. 
5. See infra notes 31-32, 39-40 and accompanying text. 
6. See infra Part II.A-B for a discussion of how the Supreme Court has 
reasserted federalism by limiting Congress' power under the Commerce 
Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
7. See generally Richard E. Levy, Federalism: The Next Generation, 33 Lov. L.A. L. 
REv. 1629 (2000);James Leonard, The Shadows of Unconstitutionality: How the 
New Federalism May Affect the Anti-Discrimination Mandate of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REv. 91 (2000) (noting that the Supreme Court 
reinforced the states' constitutional position in the 1990s). 
67 
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reinforced the Eleventh Amendment and has begun striking down as 
unconstitutional provisions in statutes that disregard a state's 
sovereignty and allow private individuals to sue a state.8 
In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,9 the latest in 
this line of cases, the Supreme Court examined the constitutionality10 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 11 in which Congress 
specifically abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. 12 
Until recently, the issue of whether a state employee could sue the 
state as its employer under the ADA remained divided among the 
circuits. 13 On February 21, 2001, the Supreme Court's opinion settled 
this division and strengthened state sovereign immunity under the 
Eleventh Amendment. 14 In Garrett, the Supreme Court found that 
Congress improperly abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment 
immunity with the ADA and thus, held that a private citizen cannot 
sue the state under the ADA. 15 
Some scholars fear that this decision may "leave [disabled] 
employees of states without a means of enforcing their rights under 
federal laws."16 However, this decision does not eliminate an 
individual's protection under state law, especially in MarylandY 
While limiting the reach of the ADA is a matter of constitutional 
interpretation, the goal of the ADA in eliminating discrimination 
against disabled individuals is a goal worth reaching.18 In the ADA's 
original form, Congress unconstitutionally usurped power from the 
8. See Leonard, supra note 7, at 92. 
9. 531 u.s. 356 (2001). 
10. See id. at 360 (noting that the Court took certiorari on the question of 
whether a private citizen can sue the state under the ADA for monetary 
damages). 
11. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000). 
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (noting that Congress instituted a federal program 
that allows a state employee to sue a state employer). 
13. See infra Part liLA (noting that before the Supreme Court decided Garrett, 
the Seventh Circuit held that Congress unconstitutionally abrogated the 
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Eleventh Circuit held that 
Congress did not abuse its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in enacting the ADA, and the Fourth Circuit stood internally 
divided over the issue). 
14. See infra Part III.B.2. 
15. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374. 
16. MatthewS. Cunningham, A Shift in the Balance of Power, Alden v. Maine and 
the Expansion of State Sovereign Immunity at Congress' Expense, 35 WAKE FoREST 
L. REv. 425, 440 (2000). 
17. See infra Part IV.A-B. 
18. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 375 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that while 
Justice Kennedy has no "doubt that the American with Disabilities Act of 
1990 will be a milestone on the path to a more decent, tolerant, progressive 
society," the states have not violated the Equal Protection Clause to justify 
an abrogation of their Eleventh Amendment immunity); see also infra notes 
139-42 and accompanying text (discussing the bipartisan effort that took 
place in passing the ADA, what many consider a high point of modern civil 
rights litigation). 
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states by ignoring both the concept of federalism and the words of the 
Eleventh Amendment. 19 While the ADA serves a necessary purpose, it 
should not come at the expense of state sovereignty. Nowhere in the 
Constitution's text does the federal government possess an 
enumerated power that justifies its assertion of the ADA over the 
states.20 Deferring to the states as independent sovereigns will not 
leave individuals without a forum for redress against disability 
discrimination by state employers.21 Specifically, Maryland has 
established a set of laws for unlawful employment practices that 
provide protections similar to the ADA.22 However, the inability to 
receive certain damages under Maryland law23 calls for the state 
legislature to amend the state disability laws to include these remedies 
and make the state laws as appealing of an option as the ADA.24 
This Comment begins broadly with a discussion of the Eleventh 
Amendment revolution on the federal level and concludes narrowly 
with its impact on Maryland. Part II examines the history of the 
judicial return to federalism. 25 Part III examines how the Supreme 
Court settled the split in the circuits over the ADA's legitimacy by 
allowing employees to sue a state employer with its decision in 
Garrett.26 Part IV explores a disabled employee's alternatives to 
protection under the ADA, such as Maryland's disability 
discrimination laws, and how these alternatives offer the same rights 
and similar protections as the ADA. 27 Part V concludes that Congress 
should not pass laws abrogating the states' Eleventh Amendment 
immunity, and that in Maryland, individuals with disabilities can still 












See infra notes 193-208 and accompanying text. 
See infra Part II.A-B (noting that Congress no longer has expansive powers 
to regulate the states and hold them captive under federal legislation by 
using its powers under the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
See infra Part IV.A. 
See infra Part IV.B.2. 
See infra notes 287-88 and accompanying text noting that under Maryland 
disability law, a plaintiff's monetary damages are limited to the equitable 
relief of back pay and do not include punitive or compensatory damages. 
See infra Part IV.B.2.a for a discussion of the remedies available to an 
aggrieved party under Maryland law, including cease and desist orders, 
reinstatement, back pay, and equitable relief. However, unlike the ADA, 
Maryland law does not allow compensatory or punitive damages. See infra 
Part IV.B.2.b. 
See infra notes 29-138 and accompanying text. 
See infra notes 144-76, 192-216 and accompanying text. 
See infra notes 221-98 and accompanying text. 
See infra notes 324-50 and accompanying text. 
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II. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT REVOLUTION 
In 1793, the United States Supreme Court decided to hear a case 
brought by two citizens of South Carolina against the State of Georgia 
to collect a debt.29 In response to this case, an early American 
Congress, which did not want a federal constitution that ignored state 
sovereignty within the Union, enacted the first amendment after the 
Bill of Rights: the Eleventh Amendment.30 However, the Supreme 
Court did not give great deference to the new amendment and 
continually sought to limit its application.31 The Supreme Court 
allowed Congress to create a growing list of exceptions to the 
constitutional protection of state sovereignty, hinting that the 
Eleventh Amendment was, in reality, only a formality lacking any real 
substance.32 Yet, in recent years the Supreme Court is moving away 
from this pragmatic approach and moving toward a more formalistic 
one. 33 Recently, the Supreme Court has begun to resurrect state 
sovereignty and reconstruct the meaning of the Eleventh 
Amendment. 34 It has reasserted a modern form of federalism by 
limiting the two most frequent means that Congress uses to abrogate a 
state's Eleventh Amendment immunity: the Commerce Clause and 
the Fourteenth Amendment.35 
A. Limiting Congress' Commerce Clause Power 
Over the past few years, the Supreme Court has initiated a judicial 
movement that places limits on Congress' use of its Commerce 
29. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 420 (1793) (noting that the Court had 
jurisdiction under the Article III power to hear controversies between "a 
State and citizens of another State"). 
30. William Funk, States Rights with a Vengeance, 25-SPG ADMIN. & REG. L. NEws 
6, *6 (2000) (noting that one purpose in passing the Eleventh Amendment 
was to overturn Chisholm). See also supra note 3 for the text of the Eleventh 
Amendment. 
31. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1989) (holding 
that the Eleventh Amendment made Congress' power to regulate interstate 
commerce "incomplete without the authority to render States liable in 
damages"); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890) (holding that Congress 
could abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity for suits by individuals); 
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821) (holding that the Court could 
exercise its jurisdiction over a federal question brought on appeal by the 
state's citizens). 
32. See, e.g., Funk, supra note 30, at *6 ("For a period it appeared that Congress 
under its Article I Powers could override a state's Eleventh Amendment 
immunity, so long as Congress expressed that intent sufficiently 
explicitly."). 
33. See infra Part II.A-B (noting the formalistic interpretations of both the 
Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
34. See generally Levy, supra note 7. See also supra notes ~ and accompanying 
text. 
35. See Levy, supra note 7, at 1638-39, 1646-53. 
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Clause36 power to pass legislation that regulates the states. 37 This 
movement extends to the use of the Commerce Clause to abrogate 
the Eleventh Amendment. 38 Before 1995, the Court stretched the 
boundaries of the Commerce Clause to justify a broad array of 
federally supervised laws. 39 This expansive congressional power is 
most evident in "the Civil Rights Cases" of the 1960s, where Congress 
used the regulation of interstate commerce as the legal justification to 
enforce its social policy of eliminating discrimination in the South. 40 
These cases are in sharp contrast to the Supreme Court's recent 
decisions that are reeling in the federal government's power and that 
are returning the nation to one of truly duel sovereigns.41 
1. United States v. Lopez 
United States v. Lopez42 marked the beginning of the Supreme 
Court's return to federalism. 43 In Lopez, the Court struck down the 
Federal Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990,44 because the Act lacked a 






U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("To regulate commerce with foreign nations, 
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."). 
See Levy, supra note 7, at 1638-39; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549, 561 (1995) (holding that gun possession does not "substantially 
affect[]" interstate commerce, and that Congress does not have the power 
to regulate firearm possession in a school zone, leaving this activity to the 
states to police). 
See Seminole Tribe ofFla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,72-73 (1996) (concluding 
that Congress could not use its Commerce Clause power to abrogate a 
state's Eleventh Amendment immunity). 
Levy, supra note 7, at 1638 (stating that "it was generally easier for Congress 
and the Court to rely on the commerce power for most federal 
legislation"); Anna J. Cramer, Note, The Right Results for the Wrong Reasons: 
An Historical and Functional Analysis of the Commerce Clause, 53 V AND. L. REv. 
271, 283 (2000) (noting that Congress used its expansive Commerce Clause 
power "to enact thousands of laws"); Melinda M. Renshaw, Comment, 
Choosing Between Principles of Federal Power: The Civil Rights Remedy of the 
Violence Against Women Act, 47 EMORY LJ. 819, 824 (1998) (stating that 
during the expansive era of the Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court 
"effectively gave Congress the ability to regulate intrastate activities that 
Congress previously was prohibited from regulating because they had been 
defined as local in nature"). 
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299-304 (1964) (holding that a 




interstate commerce and justifies Congress' regulation); Heart of Atlanta 
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 249-58 (1964) (noting that racial 
discrimination has a negative impact on interstate commerce, which 
justified Congress regulating hotels). 
41. See Levy, supra note 7, at 1638-39 ("These new federalism decisions establish 
limits on both the substantive scope of federal authority under the 
commerce power and the means that can be used to implement regulatory 
decisions within the scope of that authority."). 
514 u.s. 549 (1995). 
See Levy, supra note 7, at 1639. 
18 u.s.c. § 922(q) (1994). 
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under the Commerce Clause. 45 Mter the Court returned the "police 
power" to the states, it also began to focus on restoring the Eleventh 
Amendment, another aspect of federalism. 46 
2. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida 
In the year after Lopez, the Court ruled on Seminole Tribe of Florida v. 
Florida47 and took the first step toward reasserting Eleventh 
Amendment immunity. In Seminole Tribe, the Court noted that 
Congress, through its power under the Indian Commerce Clause,48 
passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.49 Before this case, 
Congress had relied on the precedent set forth in Pennsylvania v. 
Union Gas Co. 5° when using the Commerce Clause to abrogate a state's 
Eleventh Amendment protection. 5 1 However, the Court used Seminole 
Tribe to overrule Union Gas and to serve as the catalyst for the growing 
federalism revolution. 52 Seminole Tribe prevented Congress from using 
the Commerce Clause to supercede the Eleventh Amendment and 
checked Congress' most effective tool in regulating the fifty states as a 
whole.53 Noting the importance of enforcing the Eleventh 
Amendment, the Supreme Court held that "[e]ven when the 
Constitution vests in Congress complete lawmaking authority over a 
particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional 
authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting States."54 
This decision aided the new federalism movement by signifYing that 
45. Lopez., 514 U.S. at 561. 
46. See Levy, supra note 7, at 1641-42 (noting that while the limitation of 
Congress' Commerce Clause power is the more pronounced judicial 
movement, the Court is expanding this federalism movement to include 
the Eleventh Amendment and intends to "invalidat[e] legislative means 
that interfer[e] with state sovereignty"). 
47. 517 u.s. 44 (1996). 
48. See supra note 36 for the text of the Commerce Clause. 
49. 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (1988); see also Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47 (noting that 
this Act authorized a tribe to sue a state in federal court if the duty to 
negotiate in good faith was not fulfilled). 
50. 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 
(1996) 0 
51. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text. 
52. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72. The Court stated that: 
!d. 
In overruling Union Gas today, we reconfirm that the background 
principle of state sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh 
Amendment is not so ephemeral as to dissipate when the subject of 
the suit is an area, like the regulation of Indian commerce, that is 
under the exclusive control of the Federal Government. 
53. See Cunningham, supra note 16, at 425. 
54. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72. 
2001] A Return to State Sovereignty 73 
the enactment of a socially significant regulation "cannot be used to 
circumvent ... constitutional limitations."55 
Seminole Tribe removed Congress' ability to use its Commerce Clause 
power to authorize private suits against a state in federal court, 56 but 
left unanswered the issue of whether individuals could bring such a 
suit in their state courts. 57 
3. Alden v. Maine 
In 1999, the Court returned to the question of whether individuals 
could sue a state in their state courts with its decision in Alden v. 
Maine. 58 The Court found that even before the Eleventh Amendment 
became part of the Constitution, the protection provided by state 
sovereign immunity shielded the states from non-consensual suits.59 
The Supreme Court reiterated the founders' intention to preserve 
federalism by stating that "federalism requires that Congress treat the 
States in a manner consistent with their status as residuary sovereigns 
and joint participants in the governance of the Nation."60 
While sovereign immunity and the Eleventh Amendment do not 
immunize a state from all suits,61 the Alden Court expanded the new 
federalism. The Court held that Congress could not use its 
enumerated powers under the Commerce Clause to authorize a 
private suit against a state in a state's court because it 
unconstitutionally abrogated the Eleventh Amendment.62 
Mter Seminole Tribe and Alden, the Supreme Court had once again 
significantly reduced Congress' power by reintroducing the Eleventh 
55. /d. at 73; see also Levy, supra note 7, at 1642 (noting that Congress could 
regulate these activities, but the Court would "invalidate [ ] legislative 
means that interfered with state sovereignty"). 
56. See Chad A. Horner, Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity, 22 U. ARK. 
LITTLE RocK L. REv. 777, 777 (2000). 
57. See infra Part II.A.3. 
58. 527 u.s. 706 (1999). 
59. /d. at 715-16 ("[T]he doctrine that a sovereign could not be sued without its 
consent was universal in the States when the Constitution was drafted and 
ratified."). 
60. /d. at 748. 
61. See id. at 755-56. First, if a state consents, sovereign immunity does not 
shield a state from suits based on alleged violations of law, including 
statutes that Congress properly enacts to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment, because there are instances when federal law reigns supreme. 
/d. at 755-56. Second, sovereign immunity only protects the suits against 
states, not entities like "a municipal corporation or other governmental 
entity which is not an arm of the State." /d. Finally, sovereign immunity 
does not completely protect state officers from suits. /d. 
62. See id. at 752-54. If the Court allowed suits authorized by Congress' 
Commerce Clause power to continue in state courts, its ruling would be 
inconsistent with Seminole Tribe in which it prohibited these same suits in 
federal courts. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47. 
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Amendment into the nation's jurisprudence.63 However, Congress 
still had other avenues to direct its legislation around state 
sovereignty.64 The Supreme Court next turned its attention to the 
related issue of whether Congress could abrogate the states' Eleventh 
Amendment immunity through appropriate legislation upholding the 
Fourteenth Amendment.65 
B. Removing Congress' Power Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment66 protects individuals 
from a violation of their rights secured by the Amendment,67 and 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment68 serves as the constitutional 
basis for Congress to provide legislation to meet this end.69 However, 
because the Supreme Court had historically defined Congress' power 
to regulate the states in terms of interstate commerce, the Court never 
clarified congressional authority under other powers, including 
Section 5.70 Most notably, the United States Supreme Court had to 
decide whether Congress abused its Section 5 power in passing 
legislation that abrogated state sovereignty by authorizing suits against 
the states. 71 The Court gave a broad interpretation of this power in 
Katzenbach v. Morgan. 72 In Katzenbach, the Court allowed Congress to 
pass legislation to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive 





See Alden, 527 U.S. at 758 (noting that "Congress has vast powers but not all 
powers"); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47. 
See Alden, 527 U.S. at 758. While Congress cannot regulate a state as freely 
as it could a corporation, Congress may still require states to comply with 
federal statutes if, in passing these statutes, Congress treats the states as 
independent sovereigns and "joint participants in a federal system." !d. 
Horner, supra note 56, at 780. To validly open a state to suits under a 
federal statute, "Congress has to enact a law pursuant to another power in 
the Constitution, such as the Fourteenth Amendment." !d.; see also infra 
Part II.B. 
U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV,§ 1. 
!d. 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life liberty, or property, without the 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws. 
67. !d. 
68. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV,§ 5. "The Congress shall have power to enforce 
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." !d. 
69. Levy, supra note 7, at 1647. 
70. !d. at 1645. 
71. !d. at 1646-47. 
72. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). In this case, the Supreme Court examined the 
constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in which Congress 
intended to preserve the right to vote for Puerto Rican immigrants who 
were registered voters in New York City and who were prevented from 
voting because the election laws of New York required the voter to be able 
to read and write English. !d. at 643-44. 
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[H] eld that Congress could act based upon either its deter-
mination that regulating conduct may prevent future viola-
tions or on factual determinations that would establish a 
violation of substantive rights as defined by the Court, and 
even implied that Congress might by statute broaden the 
scope of substantive rights protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 73 
75 
This case appeared to give Congress unlimited discretion in its use 
of the Fourteenth Amendment in passing appropriate legislation, but 
since 1997, the Supreme Court handed down a triad of cases,74 which 
signify that the return to federalism also concerns Congress' power 
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
1. City of Boerne v. Flores 
In the first of the cases signifying a return to federalism, City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 75 the Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 76 which Con-
gress enacted in response to Emplayment Division Department of Human 
Resources of Oregon v. Smith.77 In Boerne, Congress had implemented 
RFRA's requirements on the states through its authority granted by 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.78 The Court did not deny 
Congress' ability to pass laws under its Section 5 power to enforce the 
right to free exercise of religion 79 but declined to authorize unlimited 
congressional authority to enforce "appropriate legislation. "80 
In City of Boerne, the Court stated that Congress abused its power 
because it did not enforce a constitutional right with a remedy, but 
73. Levy, supra note 7, at 1647. 
74. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Fla. Prepaid Postsecon-
dary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coli. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
75. 521 u.s. 507 (1997). 
76. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (West Supp. V 1993). 
77. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Smith involved the firing of two Native American em-
ployees who lost their jobs because of their use of peyote, a drug used in 
their culture's religious ceremonies. /d. at 874. The Supreme Court in 
Smith held that the government's regulation of drugs and other harmful 
conduct does not hinge upon a balance of the government's action on an 
individual versus that individual's religious belief. /d. at 890; see also Boerne, 
521 U.S. at 512-14. In response to this case, Congress created the RFRA, 
which "prohibits '[g] overnment' from 'substantially burden [ing]' a per-
son's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general 
applicability .... " /d. at 515 (alterations in original) (quoting RFRA, 42 
U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-1). 
78. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 517. 
79. !d. at 519. 
80. /d. ("Congress' power under [Section] 5, however, extends only to 'en-
forc[ing]' the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment."). 
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rather changed the right's substance.81 The Court argued that RFRA 
went beyond remedying wrongs against which the Fourteenth Amend-
ment protects,82 and hindered federalism in two ways. First, it im-
posed a large load of litigation onto the state courts.83 Second, it 
usurped the states' traditional regulatory power.84 The Court con-
cluded that Congress exceeded its authority in enacting RFRA be-
cause it violated the system of separate powers in the federal 
government, but more importantly, it upset the state-federal balance 
in favor of federal supremacy.85 
2. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College 
Savings Bank 
Mter Bourne, the Supreme Court continued to reserve more 
autonomy for the states. In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education 
Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,86 the Supreme Court examined 
the constitutionality of the Patent and Plant Variety Protection 
Remedy Clarification Act87 ("Patent Remedy Act").88 With the Patent 
Remedy Act, Congress specifically abrogated the states' Eleventh 
Amendment immunity by exposing the states to suits for patent 
infringement.89 Mter Seminole Tribe,9° Congress could not abrogate 
state sovereign immunity using the Commerce Clause, but the federal 
government argued that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
justified the legislation.91 However, the Court again held that 
Eleventh Amendment immunity is not absolute and "that for 
Congress to invoke [Section] 5, it must identify conduct transgressing 
the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive provisions, and must tailor 
its legislative scheme to remedying or preventing such conduct."92 
The Court found that Congress did not include any constitutional 
justification for the abrogation under the Fourteenth Amendment93 
and held as unconstitutional the use of Section 5 to enforce this 
legislation. 94 
81. See id. ("[Congress] has been given the power 'to enforce,' not the power to 
determine what constitutes a constitutional violation."). 
82. Id. at 534. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 536. 
86. 527 u.s. 627 (1999). 
87. 35 u.s.c. § 296 (1992). 
88. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 631. 
89. Id. at 630. 
90. See supra Part II.A.2 for a discussion of Seminole Tribe. 
91. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 638-39. 
92. Id. at 639. 
93. Id. ("In enacting the Patent Remedy Act, however, Congress identified no 
pattern of patent infringement by the States, let alone a pattern of 
constitutional violations."). 
94. Id. at 647. 
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Acknowledging that Congress did not have a constitutional basis to 
abrogate state sovereign immunity, the Court also added a powerful 
warning to Congress that it must allow the states to provide 
regulations and that it could not regulate every aspect of the country 
from the nation's capital.95 Congress had created the Patent Remedy 
Act because a patent infringement that does not have a remedy would 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment.96 However, Congress provided 
its own remedy without determining whether the states could regulate 
this problem themselves.97 Congress "barely considered the 
availability of state remedies for patent infringement and hence 
whether the States' conduct might have amounted to a constitutional 
violation under the Fourteenth Amendment."98 
At the congressional hearings for the Act's adoption, witnesses 
testified about potential state remedies.99 One witness stated that, 
"[t]he primary point made by these witnesses, however, was not that 
state remedies were constitutionally inadequate, but rather that they 
were less convenient than federal remedies, and might undermine the 
uniformity of patent law."100 The Court noted the importance of 
uniform patent laws but held that this rationale could not justify the 
abrogation of state sovereign immunity.101 
3. Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents 
In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 102 the most important of the 
three cases, the Supreme Court held that Congress had exceeded its 
Section 5 power by abrogating state sovereign immunity with the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967103 (ADEA).104 Congress 
enacted the ADEA to eliminate age employment discrimination.105 
Originally, the ADEA offered to an employee claiming age 
discrimination a remedial civil suit against any private employer who 
violated the Act. 106 However, in 1974, Congress extended the 
meaning of "employer" and "employee" to cover state employers and 
employees, and in effect extended the "application of the ADEA's 
95. !d. at 645. 
96. !d. at 639. 
97. !d. at 640. 




102. 528 u.s. 62 (2000). 
103. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. V 2000). 
104. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 67. 
105. See id. at 66 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1), which states that it is unlawful for 
an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or 
otherwise discriminate against any individual . . . because of such 
individual's age"). 
106. !d. at 67. 
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substantive requirements to the States."107 The Supreme Court 
concluded that this statutory revision indicated Congress' intent to 
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity to civil suits 
brought by private citizens.108 Repeatedly, the Court found that no 
ambiguity existed in the ADEA's language, and the Court read 
Congress' words as a usurpation of state sovereignty. 109 
In Kimel, the issue centered on Congress' power set by Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to expose the states to civil suits under 
the ADEA. 110 Looking at the ADEA, the Court conCluded that the Act 
was not "appropriate legislation" under Section 5Y 1 Because the 
ADEA does not protect "a suspect class,"112 and does not fall under 
"equal protection jurisprudence,"113 the Court concluded that 
Congress' use of Section 5 does not merit the abrogation of Eleventh 
Amendment immunity. 114 Additionally, the Court went back to the 
congressional record in an effort to find a justification for Congress' 
paternalism over the states passing the ADEA, and it found none. 115 
Justice O'Connor, in writing for the Kimel court, could have 
concluded her opinion with Congress' misappropriation of its Section 
5 power with respect to a government of duel sovereigns, but she did 
107. /d. at 68 (noting that the revision of 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) includes state 
employers and employees). 
108. /d. at 67. 
109. /d. at 74. 
110. /d. at 80. The Court's recognition that "the Eleventh Amendment and the 
principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited by 
the enforcement provisions of [Section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." 
/d. (citations omitted). 
111. /d. at 82-83. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress broad 
power to secure the rights and protections guaranteed under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and it grants Congress the ability to create 
remedies, and to deter future violations of the Amendment. /d. at 80. 
However, Section 5 also imposes limits upon Congress only to "enforce" 
constitutional violations, and not determine what constitutes one. /d. at 81 
(noting the separation of powers issue and the Court's ultimate 
responsibility to determine the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive 
meaning). 
112. Unlike race and gender, age does not qualify as a suspect class, a class that 
deserves more protection under the Equal Protection Clause. /d. at 83. 
"Older persons, again, unlike those who suffer discrimination on the basis 
of race or gender, have not been subjected to a 'history of purposeful 
unequal treatment."' /d. (citations omitted). Governmental age 
discrimination only requires rational review; thus "[s]tates may discriminate 
on the basis of age without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the 
age classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate state 
interest." /d. at 83. 
113. /d. at 87-88 (stating "that the ADEA's protection extends beyond the 
requirements of the Equal Protection Clause"). 
114. /d. at 67. 
115. /d. at 91 ("A review of the ADEA's legislative record as a whole, then, reveals 
that Congress had virtually no reason to believe that state and local 
governments were unconstitutionally discriminating against their 
employees on the basis of age."). 
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not. The Court again referred to the states' laws for remedies 
concerning age discrimination by state employers, and it reassured 
employees that without this federal legislation, the country would not 
leave its elder employees without recourse. 116 Justice O'Connor 
found little evidence of rampant age discrimination by a state in its 
employment practices, but if any existed, she stated that an individual 
would have a state remedy: 117 "State employees are protected by state 
age discrimination statutes, and may recover money damages from 
their state employers in almost every State of the Union." 118 In stating 
this, the Court wanted to send a message to Congress that it should 
ensure that the states have adequate remedie.s before it legislates. The 
Court reminded Congress that once again, it is not the substance of 
the legislation that is important, but rather that these laws do not 
violate a state's rights. 
4. The Dissents: Criticism of the New Federal Movement 
While the United States Supreme Court continues to release 
opinions supporting the return to federalism, 119 this movement does 
not have the support of the entire Court. 120 In both Kimel121 and 
Florida Prepaid, 122 the Supreme Court was split five to four with a slight 
majority in favor of preserving state sovereignty through the Eleventh 
Amendment. 123 
In Kimel, the four anti-federalist Justices began their dissent with the 
position that Congress does have the power to impose its regulation 
over the states. 124 They concluded that Congress could use the ADEA 
to eliminate work-related age discrimination against both private and 
state employers. 125 They reasoned that saying otherwise would strike 
at the heart of the way Congress passes laws that bind our society. 126 












Id. at 91-92. 
/d. at 91. 
/d. 
See supra notes 6-8, 33-35 and accompanying text. 
Funk, supra note 30, at 7. 
528 U.S. 62 (2000). See also supra Part II.B.3 for a discussion of the 
majority's decision in KimeL 
527 U.S. 627 (2000). See also supra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of the 
majority's decision in Florida Prepaid. 
Funk, supra note 30, at 6-7. "Kimel, like the other Eleventh Amendment/ 
states rights cases, was a 5-4 decision, with the Court splitting along what is 
becoming an increasingly frequent fault-line - Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, 
O'Connor, and Kennedy v. Souter, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Stevens." I d. at 7. 
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 93 (noting that Justice Stevens was joined by Justices 
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
Id. The dissent equates the ADEA's goals to those of wage and health 
regulations. /d. 
/d. ("Congress' power to authorize federal remedies against state agencies 
that violate statutory obligations is coextensive with its power to impose 
those obligations on the States in the first place."). 
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sovereign immunity places any limitations on Congress' ability to 
implement remedies against anyone who violates a federal statute.127 
The dissent in Kimel saw sovereign immunity, not as a system of the 
federal and state governments working independently as part of a 
single union, but as an "ancient judge-made doctrine."128 They 
believed that the majority's form of neo-federalism incorrectly 
manipulated and misplaced the ideals that the founders preached. 129 
The dissent did not want the Court to serve as the protector of 
federalism 130 because the "structural safeguards" in place when 
Congress passes a law should automatically preserve the states' 
interests. 131 The dissent concluded that the states have their voices 
heard when Congress enacts a law because each state is given an equal 
voice in the Senate by sending two representatives. 132 Accordingly, 
the dissent argued for the ADEA's constitutionality because one "can 
safely presume that the burdens the statute imposes on the 
sovereignty of the several States were taken into account during the 
deliberative process leading to the enactment of the measure."133 
While the majority used its opinion to attack Congress' use of 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to authorize the ADEA's 
abrogation of a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity,134 the dissent 
in Kimel chose to criticize the majority's assertion of federalism. 135 In 
the dissents' view, Congress passed a valid law; it did not abuse its 
power.136 The dissent argued that the majority's return to states' 
rights forced the Court to examine the extent of Congress' power 
granted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 137 The 
dissent accused the majority of 'judicial activism" when it decided 
Seminole Tribe, Alden, Florida Prepaid, and Kimel, and demanded that 
















/d. at 93, 95. "[T] he Framers did not view the Court as the ultimate 
guardian of the States' interest in protecting their own sovereignty from 
impairment by 'burdensome' federal laws." /d. at 95. 
/d. at 93. 
/d. 
/d. at 96. 
See supra Part II.B.3. 
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 97 (noting that "today's decision ... rests entirely on a 
novel judicial interpretation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which 
the court treats as though it were a constitutional precept"). 
See id. at 98. 
See id. (stating that the Court has unnecessarily been forced "to resolve 
vexing questions of constitutional law respecting Congress' [Section 5] 
authority"). 
/d. at 98-99. 
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III. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND THE 
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 
Since the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the 
American public has praised the Act as the hallmark of modern 
American civil rights legislation. 139 The Act stands as a symbol of our 
nation's accommodation of all of its disabled citizens.140 Political 
analysts regard the Act as evidence of the good that can come out of a 
bipartisan effort in the federal govemment. 141 Few can argue against 
the ADA's purpose of providing a "clear and comprehensive national 
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities."142 However, before the Supreme Court decided Board of 
Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 143 applying the Eleventh 
Amendment to the ADA caused a lot of confusion throughout our 
nation's courts. 144 
A. Various Approaches in Applying the Eleventh Amendment to the ADA 
Among the Circuits 
Two schools of thought existed concerning the issue of whether 
Congress violated the Eleventh Amendment when it passed the ADA, 
allowing state employers to be sued under the Act. The ADA included 
a regulatory scheme that allowed individuals to sue a state in federal 
court for monetary damages, and this issue divided the circuits before 
the Supreme Court intervened. 145 
1. The Seventh Circuit's Approach 
First, some courts advocated a form of neo-federalism, which 
enforces the Eleventh Amendment and demands that Congress 
respect state sovereignty through its legislation. In Erickson v. Board of 
Governors of State Colleges and Universities for Northeastern Illinois 
University, 146 the Seventh Circuit started where the United States 
Supreme Court left off; it looked at the Court's last three decisions 
139. Thomas D. Kershaw, An ADA Primer: What the General Practitioner Should 
Know, 43 Aovoc. 8, 8 (Sept. 2000). 
140. Id. 
141. Id. (noting that when the ADA was passed in 1990, President George H. W. 
Bush held office); see also Miranda Oshige McGowan, Reconsidering the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 GA. L. REv. 27, 30, 30 n.2 (2000) (noting 
the overwhelming bipartisan approval of the ADA in both the Senate and 
the House). 
142. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2000). 
143. 531 u.s. 356 (2001). 
144. See id. at 363 (stating that the court granted certiorari "to resolve a split 
among the Courts of Appeals"); see also infra Part liLA. 
145. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363. 
146. 207 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2000). 
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concerning Congress' Section 5 power. 147 In Erickson, the Seventh 
Circuit equated the ADA to the ADEA, 148 first, by holding that the 
ADA explicitly abrogated the states' sovereign immunity under the 
Eleventh Amendment, 149 and second, by holding that disability 
discrimination only requires rational review under the Equal 
Protection Clause.150 Referring to Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 151 
the Court understood that the government's consideration of an 
employee's disability is a constitutional issue. 152 The Court held that 
if the RFRA153 and the ADEA "exceed the [Section] 5 power, then so 
does the ADA - at least to the extent it extends beyond remedies for 
irrational discrimination."154 
2. The Eleventh Circuit's Approach 
Other courts have held that Congress properly abrogated the states' 
Eleventh Amendment immunity with the passage of the ADA. In 
Garrett v. University of Alabama at Birmingham Board of Trustees, 155 the 
Eleventh Circuit examined the ADA's abrogation of state sovereignty 
and held that states are not immune from private civil suits under the 
ADA.156 The Eleventh Circuit stated that Congress showed a clear 
intent to abrogate states' sovereign immunity with the ADA, and that 
the Eleventh Amendment does not shield any state from a lawsuit. 157 
It concluded that "the ADA is a valid exercise of the Enforcement 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that the states do not have 
sovereign immunity from claims brought under the ADA." 158 
147. /d. at 947 ("Three times during the last four Terms, the Supreme Court has 
addressed the extent of the legislative power under [Section] 5."). 
148. See supra Part II.B.3 for discussion of Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents and 
why the Supreme Court held that the ADEA was an unconstitutional 
abrogation of the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. 
149. Erickson, 207 F.3d at 947. 
150. /d. 
151. 473 u.s. 432 (1985). 
152. See Erickson, 207 F.3d at 949. . 
153. See supra Part II.B.1 for a discussion of City of Boerne v. Flores and why the 
Supreme Court held that RFRA violated the Eleventh Amendment. 
154. Anckson, 207 F.3d at 951. 
155. 193 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 1999), rev'd, Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. 
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that Congress validly abrogated the 
Eleventh Amendment and individuals may sue the state). See also infra 
Part III.B for a discussion of the facts and the Supreme Court's decision. 
156. Garrett, 207 F.3d at 1216. 
157. /d. at 1218 (noting that in 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (1994) "Congress [had] 
unequivocally expressed its intent for the ADA to abrogate sovereign 
immunity"). 
158. /d. 
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3. The Fourth Circuit's Approach 
The Fourth Circuit, the circuit that presides over Maryland, stood 
internally divided over this issue.159 In Amos v. Maryland Department of 
Public Safety and Correctional Services, 160 the Fourth Circuit held that 
private ADA claims were allowed against state prisons. 161 Here, the 
court examined the history that Congress had compiled of past 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities to prove that a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause had occurred. 162 With the 
existence of sufficient evidence, the ADA "[was] indeed adequately 
justified as remedial legislation and therefore fully within the scope of 
Congress' enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment."163 
Because the court determined that Congress did not exceed its 
Section 5 power in enacting the ADA, Maryland could not assert the 
defense of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. 164 
Conversely, the same circuit, in the same year, issued another 
decision that advocated state sovereignty.165 In Brown v. North Carolina 
Division of Motor Vehicles, 166 the Fourth Circuit held unconstitutional a 
regulation based on the ADA that prohibited the state from charging 
disabled drivers five dollars for a placard that enabled them to park in 
handicapped spots. 167 The court recapped the history of North 
Carolina's system of accommodating the disabled with parking. 168 It 
then emphasized that with an adequate state system in place, the 
federal government decided to implement the ADA. 169 Because 
disability discrimination only receives rational review under equal 













CompareAmos v. Md. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 178 F.3d 212 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(hofding that an individual may sue a state under the ADA), with Brown v. 
N.C. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 166 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding as 
unconstitutional a regulation that requires an accommodation by the 
state's motor vehicle agency). 
178 F.3d 212 (4th Cir. 1999). 
/d. at 223. 
/d. at 218-19 ("When enacting the ADA, Congress made several findings of 
both past and present discrimination against the disabled in the country's 
general population that it had determined violated the Equal Protection 
Clause."). 
/d. at 219. 
See id. at 223 ("The State of Maryland is entitled under the 11th 
Amendment of the United States Constitution to immunity from suit under 
the ADA unless Congress has validly abrogated that immunity .... The 
defense of sovereign immunity is not available to Appellees in this case."). 
See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
166 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999). 
!d. at 701. 
/d. (noting that since 1972, the State provided parking for the disabled and 
it has maintained and improved this system over the years). 
!d. ("Nearly twenty years after North Carolina began providing for 
handicapped parking, Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities 
Act."). 
See infra note 204 and accompanying text. 
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use Section 5 to pass the ADA over the existing state law if the state 
clearly demonstrated animus to this group. 171 The court did not find 
the animus necessary to justify the abrogation of state sovereignty. 172 
Two separate interpretations of the ADA's validity exist, but the 
Supreme Court provided some clarity and cohesion in deciding Board 
of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett.173 The Supreme Court 
continued the federalist revolution by advocating state sovereignty.174 
It removed the ability of individuals to sue the state for disability 
discrimination under the ADA. 175 While the Court held one aspect of 
the ADA unconstitutional, it also recommended that individuals who 
seek redress against the state look to their own state's laws for 
remedies. 176 
B. The United States Supreme Court's Decision in Board of Trustees of 
the University of Alabama v. Garrett 
1. Factual and Procedural Background 
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett177 involved two 
separate plaintiffs, both of whom worked for the State of Alabama. 178 
Patricia Garrett worked for the University of Alabama at Birmingham 
Hospital, where she served as the Director of Nursing. 179 During her 
employment, she developed breast cancer, which forced her to take a 
lot of time off work for her medical treatment. 180 When she came 
back to work, her supervisor informed her that she could no longer 
hold a director position, and she had to take a lower paying, less 
prestigious position.181 
The other plaintiff, Milton Ash, worked for the Alabama 
Department of Youth Services as a security guard. 182 He originally 
had chronic asthma that required him to avoid carbon monoxide and 
cigarette smoke, and he later leamed that he suffered from sleep 
apnea.183 To accommodate his disabilities, Ash asked his employer to 
171. See Brown, 166 F.3d at 707. 
172. Id. "Animus 'in the air,' however, does not permit Congress to effect a 
wholesale redistribution of power between the states and the central 
government." Id. 
173. 531 u.s. 356 (2001). 
174. See infra Part III.B.2. 
175. See infra note 208 and accompanying text. 
176. See infra notes 209-10 and accompanying text. 
177. 531 u.s. 356 (2001). 





183. Id.; see also STEDMAN's MEDICAL DICTIONARY 114 (26th ed. 1995) (defining 
"apnea" as an "[a]bsence of breathing," and "sleep apnea" as apnea "during 
sleep, associated with frequent awakening and often with daytime 
sleepiness"). 
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reassign him to the day shift and place him in a location where he 
would avoid smoky areas. 184 When the state employer refused to 
provide these accommodations, Ash filed suit with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission alleging discrimination. 185 
Mter filing suit, Ash noticed that his performance evaluations had 
suffered. 186 
Both plaintiffs sued the State under the ADA for money damages in 
federal district court. 187 The State made a motion for summary 
judgment on the basis that the ADA unconstitutionally abrogated its 
protection under the Eleventh Amendment and that Congress had 
exceeded its power in enacting this portion of the Act. 188 In a single 
decision, the district court granted summary judgment, siding with 
the State. 189 However, on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit consolidated 
both cases and held that Congress did not exceed its power in 
enacting the ADA, and that the states could not claim Eleventh 
Amendment immunity as a defense. 190 The United States Supreme 
Court then granted certiorari "to resolve a split among the Courts of 
Appeals on the question whether an individual may sue a State for 
money damages in federal court under the ADA."191 
2. Legal Analysis 
The majority in Garrett192 began its rationale with the rule that if the 
Eleventh Amendment applied, private individuals could not sue a 
state in federal court, under federal legislation, without the state's 
consent.193 However, the Court noted that there are times when 
Congress could use its constitutional authority to abrogate this 
immunity. 194 For a federal regulation to supercede state sovereignty 
and impose compliance on the state governments, Congress must 
affirmatively answer two questions. 195 The first question is whether 
Congress expressly authorized private suits against the states. 196 With 





189. Id. at 362-63. 
190. Id. at 363. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. at 360 (noting that this case was decided by a five to four Court in which 
Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas joined for the 
majority). 
193. Id. at 363. "The ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is that 
non-consenting States may not be sued by private individuals in federal 
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the ADA, Congress satisfied this requirement. 197 The ADA specifically 
provides that states cannot shield themselves from private suits filed 
under the ADA. 198 
According to the Court in Garrett, the second question Congress 
must answer is whether Congress possesses the constitutional 
authority to regulate the subject matter proposed in the prospective 
legislation. 199 For this question, the Court examined whether 
Congress had the constitutional authority to abrogate the Eleventh 
Amendment from the states through the ADA.200 
The Supreme Court had already removed Congress' Commerce 
Clause power as a valid source of constitutional authority to abrogate 
the Eleventh Amendment,201 but Congress can force states into 
federal court with appropriate legislation under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 202 As the Court noted, with the ADA 
Congress clearly used Section 5 as a basis for enacting this 
legislation.203 However, legislation intended to prevent disability 
discrimination does not constitute "appropriate legislation" under 
Section 5 because the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not afford individuals with disabilities "suspect 
class" status.204 
197. /d. at 363-64 (stating that the "first of these requirements is not in dispute 
here"). 
198. /d. at 364 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12202, the Court noted that Congress wrote 
that "'[a] State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States from an action in [a] Federal or State 
court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter'"). 
199. /d. 
200. /d. ("The question, then, is whether Congress acted within its constitutional 
authority by subjecting the States to suits in federal court for money 
damages under the ADA."). 
201. /d. (noting that Congress cannot use its power enumerated in Article I to 
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment); see also supra Part II.B. 
202. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365 (noting that Section 5 allows Congress to pass laws 
that enforce the rights secured under Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
203. /d. at 364 n.3; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (stating that one of the 
ADA's purposes is "to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, 
including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate 
commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-
to-day by people with disabilities"). 
204. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366. Referring to Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 
4 73 U.S. 432 ( 1985), the Court followed the rule that state action that 
classifies based on disabilities only receives rational review. /d. (noting that 
in Cleburne, the Court held "that such legislation incurs only the minimum 
'rational-basis' review applicable to general social and economic 
legislation"). This holding means that a state may classify or make a 
decision based on an individual's disability and not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause. /d. at 366-67. The state does not need to provide its 
reason for the classification when it makes its decision, and only upon a 
challenge to the decision's legitimacy, does the state need to provide "'a 
rational basis for the classification."' /d. at 367 (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 
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While the ADA does not demand a higher form of scrutiny under 
the Equal Protection Clause, the Court stated that Congress could still 
qualify this Act as appropriate legislation and force the states into 
court if Congress found a pattern of discrimination against individuals 
with disabilities by the states.205 However, the Court found no 
evidence of a pattern of statewide discrimination against individuals 
with disabilities that would rise to the level of a Fourteenth 
Amendment violation.206 Of course, circumstances exist where state 
employers irrationally discriminate against an individual with a 
disability, but the Court reasoned that these instances were so limited 
that the ADA does not qualify as appropriate legislation under Section 
5.207 Without a pattern of irrational discrimination by the states, the 
Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits by 
private individuals against a state in federal court under the ADA. 208 
Because the Court held that the ADA no longer provides 
individuals with disabilities the ability to receive monetary damages 
against a state employer, the Court directed such individuals to seek 
redress under state law and state discrimination statutes. 209 The 
Court found that every state has its own set of laws to combat disability 
discrimination, and the states had these laws in place before Congress 
enacted the ADA granting additional protection.210 Through its 
holding in this case, the Supreme Court once again let Congress know 
U.S. 312, 320 (1993)). See also supra note 112 for the meaning of suspect 
class. 
205. /d. at 363. "Accordingly, [Section] 5 legislation reaching beyond the scope 
of [Section] 1 's actual guarantees must exhibit 'congruence and 
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the 
means adopted to that end."' !d. at 365 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 
521 u.s. 507, 536 (1997)). 
206. !d. at 368 ("The legislative record of the ADA, however, simply fails to show 
that Congress did in fact identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination 
in employment against the disabled."). 
207. /d. at 370 (finding that "these incidents taken together fall far short of even 
suggesting the pattern of unconstitutional discrimination on which 
[Section] 5 legislation must be based"). 
208. /d. at 360. 
209. /d. at 374 n.9 ("[S]tate laws protecting the rights of persons with disabilities 
in employment and other aspects of life provide independent avenues of 
redress."); see also Brief for Petitioners, Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. 
Garrett, No. 99-1240, 2000 WL 821035 app. A (2001) (noting that this 
appendix contains the disability discrimination laws of all fifty states). 
210. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368 n.5. 
It is worth noting that by the time that Congress enacted the ADA 
in 1990, every State in the Union had enacted such measures. At 
least one Member of Congress remarked that "this is probably one 
of the few times where the States are so far out in front of the 
Federal Government, it's not funny." 
/d. (quoting Hearing on Discrimination Against Cancer Victims and the 
Handicapped before the Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities of 
the House Committee on Education and Labor, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess., 5 
(1987)). 
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that the states should share in the governance of the country, and that 
Congress must enact its legislation properly and respect its co-
sovereignty with the states. 
3. A Five-Four Decision 
The dissent in Garretf211 did not direct individuals with disabilities to 
state law to seek remedies because these Justices concluded that 
Congress did not exceed its power in enacting the ADA as appropriate 
legislation under Section 5.212 Using the same evidence that the 
majority found not to constitute a pattern of irrational discrimination 
by the states, the dissent concluded that the states' role in 
discriminating against individuals with disabilities was more 
prevalent.213 The dissent noted that Congress had discovered that 
disability discrimination existed in both private businesses and local 
governments, and this finding "implicates state governments as well, 
[because] state agencies form part of that same larger society."214 The 
dissent accumulated over three hundred examples of discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities215 and concluded that this could 
serve as a valid basis for appropriate Section 5 legislation.216 
The fact that the Court did not come to a unanimous conclusion 
based on the evidence highlights the growing division in the Court 
and reflects some ideological differences.217 As this new form of 
federalism grows, the Court continues to take more power from the 
federal government and give it back to the states.218 The ADA is 
merely the latest target of the federalism movement.219 If the Court 










!d. at 376 (noting that Justices Breyer, Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg joined 
in the dissent). 
/d. at 377 ("In my view, Congress reasonably could have concluded that the 
remedy before us constitutes an 'appropriate' way to enforce this basic 
equal protection requirement. And that is all the Constitution requires."). 
!d. 
/d. at 378. 
/d. at 391-424 app. C. Specifically, in Maryland, the State did not provide 
safe and accessible public transportation for individuals with disabilities 
and had several instances in which deaf individuals were not provided 
interpreters. /d. at 409 app. C. 
!d. at 379 (quoting the majority, the dissent stated that "I fail to see how this 
evidence 'fall[s] far short of even suggesting the pattern of unconstitutional 
discrimination on which [Section] 5 legislation must be based'"). 
See supra Parts II.B, liLA for a description of the struggle between Justices 
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas, and Justices Breyer, 
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, and how Garrett continued the new 
federalism movement. 
Alison B. Bianchi, State Worker Cannot Sue Under ADA, Justices Rule, 2001 
U.S.L.W. 169, Mar. 5, 2001, at 1 (quoting David Fram of the National 
Employment Law Institute, that the "'Supreme Court is in a very pro-states' 
mindset' "). 
See supra notes 205-10 and accompanying text. 
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have to turn to their own state's laws to seek assistance when they wish 
to sue the State. Without the protection under the ADA, Maryland 
state employees can still find similar remedies under state law, because 
Maryland protects its citizens with disabilities by allowing them to sue 
the State.220 
N. MARYLAND DISABILI1Y DISCRIMINATION LAWS: HOW THE 
STATE CAN PICK UP THE SLACK 
In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,221 when Justice O'Connor held 
the ADEA unconstitutional, she did not leave the elderly without 
recourse when she directed individuals toward their own state's laws 
to recover damages against state employers.222 In Board of Trustees of 
the University of Alabama v. Garrett,223 Chief Justice Rehnquist gave the 
same instructions regarding the ADA.224 Mter Garrett, the citizens of 
every state must now turn to the laws provided by their state legislators 
if they wish to sue the state for unlawful disability discrimination in 
employment, and the citizens of Maryland are no exception.225 
Before the ADA entered our national conscience and jurisprudence, 
individuals with disabilities in Maryland were able to seek some 
protection from employment discrimination by relying on the laws of 
their own state.226 
A. Allowing Private Suits Against the State 
Because a state's discrimination against individuals with disabilities 
is only susceptible to rational review,227 there is no constitutional 
mandate for the ADA.228 In searching for protection, nothing in state 
or federal common law gave a victim of disability discrimination a 
right to assert a cause of action.229 However, Maryland saw a societal 











See Brief for Petitioners, Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, No. 99-
1240, 2000 WL 821035, app. A (2001); see also infra Part IV.B.2. 
528 U.S. 62 (2000); see also supra Part II.B.3. 
See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91; see also supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text. 
531 U.S. 356 (2001); see also supra Part III.B. 
See supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text. 
See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text. 
See infra Part IV.A-B. 
See supra note 204 and accompanying text (noting that the Supreme Court 
in Cleburne v. Cleboume Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985), held that the 
disabled do not constitute a suspect class, and are only afforded rational 
review). 
See supra notes 204-08 and accompanying text (noting that under rational 
review, state employers could discriminate on the basis of an individual's 
disability without any accountability if the state can show a legitimate 
reason for doing so). 
Dillon v. Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co., 43 Md. App. 161, 163, 403 A.2d 406, 
407 (1976) (noting that at "common law no claim may be successfully 
asserted on the ground that the claimant was discriminated against in 
employment because of a physical handicap or disability"). 
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employment discrimination, and the state legislators responded. 230 
Through the enactment of Article 49B, "the Maryland General 
Assembly created an elaborate and comprehensive statutory scheme 
for the investigation and disposition of employment discrimination 
claims· .... "231 
1. Prohibiting Disability Discrimination in Maryland 
Maryland adopted its legislation to curb disability discrimination in 
1974, sixteen years before the federal government enacted the 
ADA.232 In 1990, the ADA became the preferred legislation to 
eliminate disability discrimination in the workplace.233 However, the 
ADA's general prohibition of disability discrimination does not differ 
significantly in scope from what Maryland considers an unlawful 
employment practice under its laws,234 except that the state version 
·also includes protection for other classes: age, race, religion, color, 
sex, national origin, and marital status. 235 Maryland specifically 
protects individuals with disabilities from an employer who hires, fires, 
limits, segregates, or negatively classifies an employee on the basis of 
the employee's disability.236 
Ironically, before the ADA was enacted, both state and federal 
courts repeatedly held that comparable federal statutes did not 
preempt the states' fair employment laws.237 In Westinghouse Electric 
230. /d. at 164 n.8, 403 A.2d at 408 n.8 (noting that before 1974, an individual 
with a disability did not receive any "legislative protection" for being 
discriminated against until the General Assembly enacted section 19 of 
Article 49B, which "is currently codified as Md. Ann. Code art. 49B, § 16"). 
231. See Chekey v. BTR Realty, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 715, 716 (D. Md. 1983). 
232. See supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
233. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text. 
234. See infra Part IV.B. 
235. Compare 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a) (West 1995), with Mo. ANN. ConE art. 49B 
§ 16(a)(1) (2000). See also 2001 Md. Laws 340 (noting that the Maryland 
General Assembly has amended section 16 to include sexual orientation as 
another protected class under Article 49B). 
236. See Mo. ANN. ConE art. 49B § 16(a). 
/d. 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer: 
(1) To fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to 
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual's ... physical or 
mental handicap .... 
(2) To limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants 
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to 
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or 
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of 
the individual's ... physical or mental handicap .... 
237. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 520 F. 
Supp. 539, 550 (D. Md. 1981); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. State, 289 
N.W.2d 396, 400-01 (Minn. 1979), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 1041 (1980); 
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Corporation v. Maryland Commission on Human Relations, 238 the 
employer claimed that the federal statutory scheme to curb abuse and 
inequality with employment benefit plans, specifically Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act,239 preempted the protection 
provided by Maryland law. 240 The court rejected this claim and 
emphasized the need to maintain both federal and state laws.241 
When the Maryland General Assembly decided to codify the 
prohibition of certain types of employment discrimination in section 
16, it asserted the state's constitutional police powers.242 When a state 
legitimately uses its police powers, the court assumed that the federal 
government would only invoke the Supremacy Clause on limited 
occasions.243 Here, the ideals of federalism preserved Maryland's 
legislation. 244 
2. Waiving the Defense of Sovereign Immunity 
Under Maryland's disability discrimination laws, the state is 
accountable for its unlawful employment actions. The term 
"employer" covers both private employers and the State of Maryland 
as an employer.245 To hold Maryland accountable under these 
standards, the General Assembly went an extra step and waived the 
state's defense of sovereign immunity.246 
While Maryland waives its defense of sovereign immunity under the 











Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Comm'r of Labor and Indus., 608 P.2d 
1047, 1057-58 (Mont. 1979), appeal dismissed, 445 U.S. 921 (1980). 
520 F. Sup_r. 539 (D. Md. 1981). 
29 u.s.c. ~§ 1001-1461 (1994). 
See Westinghouse Elec. Carp., 520 F. Supp. at 542 (noting that the plaintiff 
claimed that federal law preempted sections 16 and 17 of Title 49B in the 
Annotated Code of Maryland). 
/d. at 542, 550 (noting that the "national importance of the continued 
enforcement of state fair employment laws is self-evident ... "). 
See id. at 542. 
!d. "[W]hen a State's exercise of its police power is challenged under the 
Supremacy Clause, 'we start with the assumption that the historic police 
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless 
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'" /d. (quoting Ray v. 
Atl. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1998) (second citation omitted)). 
See id. "This assumption provides assurance that 'the federal-state balance' 
will not be disturbed unintentionally by Congress or unnecessarily by the 
Courts." /d. (quoting jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) 
(second citation omitted)). 
See Mo. ANN. ConE art. 49B § 15(b). 
/d. § 17A ("This State, its officers, and its units may not raise sovereign 
immunity as a defense against a salary award in an employment 
discrimination case under§ 16 of this article."). 
See supra note 208 and accompanying text (noting that without a pattern of 
irrational discrimination by the states, Congress needed to have the states 
waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity because Congress did not have 
power under the Fourteenth Amendment to pass this legislation over the 
states). 
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enacting this section,248 the Maryland General Assembly intentionally 
decided to waive sovereign immunity only for the state law, and it did 
not give an unconditional waiver that also included the ADA.249 Every 
state could waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity under the ADA; 
however, the states were not afforded this opportunity. Without 
deferring to the states, Congress unconstitutionally abrogated the 
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity and made them subservient to 
the federal plan.250 
B. Seeking Relief Under Maryland Law 
In Maryland, an individual who has suffered employment 
discrimination because of a disability may issue a complaint with the 
Maryland Commission on Human Relations (MCHR).251 A claim 
filed with the MCHR will follow different procedures than a claim 
filed under the ADA. While an individual who claims a violation of 
the ADA initially files a claim with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 252 the ultimate adjudication of the 
ADA claim takes place in a courtroom.253 The EEOC conducts an 
investigation to determine whether "reasonable cause exists to believe 
that an unlawful employment practice has occurred or is occurring 
under Title VII or the ADA."254 Once the EEOC determines that 
248. See Mo. ANN. ConE art. 49B § 17A (noting that Maryland enacted this 
provision in 1993, which was after Congress had established the ADA). 
249. See id. 
250. See supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
251. See Mo. ANN. ConE art. 49B § 9A(a). 
Any person claiming to be aggrieved by an alleged discrimination 
prohibited by any section of this article may make, sign and file 
with the Human Relations Commission (hereinafter referred to as 
the "Commission") a complaint in writing under oath. The 
complaint shall state the name and address of the person, firm, 
association, partnership, corporation, State agency, department or 
board alleged to have committed the act of discrimination together 
with the particulars thereof; and the complaint also shall contain 
such other information as may be required from time to time by 
the Commission. A complaint must be filed within six months 
from the date of the occurrence alleged to be a violation of this 
article. 
Id.; see also THE MARYLAND INSTITUTE FOR CoNTINUING EDUCATION OF LAw-
YERS, INc., PRACTICE MANuAL FOR THE MARYLAND LAWYER, CH. Two: ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAw § 2.4 (2000) (stating that "[e]mployment discrimination 
claims may be adjudicated ... by the Maryland Commission on Human 
Relations ... " ) ; Martin Marietta Corp., Aero and Naval Sys. v. Md. Comm'n 
on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1395 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that the 
former employee filed a complaint with the MCHR when he claimed his 
employer discriminated against him because of his disabilities). 
252. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.6(a) (2000) ("The Commission shall receive 
information concerning alleged violations of Title VII or the ADA from any 
person."). 
253. See infra note 255 and accompanying text. 
254. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.21(a). 
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reasonable cause exists, the agency may issue a notice of the right to 
sue, and the aggrieved party may start the judicial process.255 
However, Maryland discrimination law differs from the ADA, because 
the state has delegated the authority to handle the employment 
discrimination claims to the MCHR256 and has given this agency quasi-
judicial power.257 In Garrett, 258 the Supreme Court removed the 
ability to sue and seek judicial recourse against a state for employment 
discrimination under the ADA,259 but Maryland's administrative 
system still provides many advantages. 
1. Administrative Actions 
While Article 49B requires an administrative adjudication, which 
excludes the right to a jury trial that exists under federal 
discrimination laws,260 the Maryland system also has benefits. The 
basic benefits of creating an agency either to implement rules or to 
handle adjudications are present with the MCHR's handling of 
disability discrimination suits: judicial economy and client 
accessibility.261 
First, Article 49B promotes judicial economy because it diverts 
employment discrimination claims away from the courthouse and to 
an administrative hearing. 262 In Maryland, a claimant does not 
present a case before a judge and jury; an administrative law judge 
(ALJ) hears the argument instead.263 While Maryland addresses these 











SeeTHE MARYLAND INSTITUTE FOR CoNTINUING EDUCATION OF LAWYERS, INc., 
supra note 251, § 2.3 (noting that a state administrative agency in Maryland 
is created by the General Assembly, which sets the scope of the agency's 
power); see also supra note 251 and accompanying text. 
THE MARYLAND INSTITUTE FOR CoNTINUING EouCATION OF LAWYERS, INc., 
supra note 251, § 2.6 (defining quasi-judicial power as an agency's ability to 
"adjudicate [ ] the rights of individual parties"); see also id. § 2.4 (noting that 
the MCHR has this adjudicative power). 
See supra Part III.B.2 for a discussion of the Supreme Court's rationale and 
holding in Garrett. 
See supra notes 208-10 and accompanying text. 
See Rosetta E. Ellis, Note, Mandatory Arbitration Provisions in Collective 
Bargaining Agreements: The Case Against Barring Statutory Discrimination Claims 
from Federal Court jurisdiction, 86 VA. L. REv. 307, 312 (2000). 
See infra notes 262-72 and accompanying text. 
See Jason W. Bridges & CaraJ. Heflin, Recent Decisions: The Maryland Court of 
Appeals, 58 Mo. L. REv. 979, 1004 (1999). "Allowing resolution outside the 
court system is another function that promotes judicial economy and 
efficiency." /d. at 1004 n.191 (citing Craig Lyle Ltd. P'ship v. Land 
O'Lakes, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 476, 483 (D. Minn. 1995)). 
SeeTHE MARYLAND INSTITUTE FOR CONTINUING EDUCATION OF LAWYERS, INC., 
supra note 251, § 2.6 (noting that the ALJ has many of the same powers as a 
court judge); see also Md. Comm'n on Human Relations v. Mayor and City 
Counsel of Bait., 86 Md. App. 167, 171, 586 A.2d 37, 39 (1991) (noting that 
in the MCHR, the ALJ has the title of hearing examiner). 
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not deprive the claimants of due process.264 In Vavasori v. Commission 
on Human Relations, 265 the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held 
that filing claims of employment discrimination in an agency gives 
due process because it provides the '"opportunity [to be heard] ... at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' "266 
Second, an administrative hearing avoids the long, complex, and 
expensive process that accompanies getting an ADA claim ready for 
trial.267 To initiate an Article 49B claim, the aggrieved party may 
submit a watered down complaint requiring only "the name and 
address of the person or entity alleged to have committed the 
discriminatory act, 'the particulars thereof,' and 'other information as 
may be required from time to time by the Commission.' "268 Article 
49B's administrative nature removes some of the adversarial tension 
found in a judicial ~roceeding269 and avoids a protracted suit with 
prompt resolution. 2 0 Also, in an MCHR hearing, the rules of 
evidence are relaxed, and an ALJ can make a decision based on 
hearsay evidence alone. 271 Additionally, if both parties consent, the 
ALJ can conduct the hearing over the telephone,272 which can 
enhance the more informal atmosphere of these proceedings. 
While the informality of an agency hearing allows an individual to 
proceed pro se, an attorney is still recommended to guide the 
individual through the administrative procedure.273 An attorney may 
help preserve the record274 for judicial review.275 An attorney could 
264. See Laura B. Black et a!., Administrative Law, 46 Mo. L. REv. 541, 566 ( 1987). 
265. 65 Md. App. 237, 500 A.2d 307 (1985). 
266. /d. at 249, 500 A.2d at 313 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 
( 1965)); see also Black, supra note 264, at 566. 
267. See Kohler v. Shenasky, 914 F. Supp. 1206, 1209-10 (D. Md. 1995) (noting 
that the procedural burdens such as filing a complaint, statute of 
limitations, investigations, and developing a case imposed on a litigant who 
pursues an ADA claim is lessened under Article 49B). 
268. /d. at 1210 (quoting Mo. ANN. CooE art. 49B § 9A(a) (1979)). 
269. /d. at 1210 n.4. 
270. See id. at 1210. "'The stated goal of the state administrative procedure is 
the prompt identification and resolution of [ ] disputes. The 
administrative scheme, including a short statute of limitations, encourages 
conciliation and private settlement through the agency's intervention in 
live disputes.'" /d. (alteration in original) (quoting Burnett v. Grattan, 468 
U.S. 42, 54 (1984)); see also THE MARYlAND INSTITUTE FOR CoNTINUING 
EDUCATION OF LAWYERS, INc., supra note 251, § 2.27 ("As opposed to a 
traditional court trial, agency hearings may be exceedingly informal."). 
271. THE MARYlAND INSTITUTE FOR CoNTINUING EouCATION OF LAWYERS, INc., 
supra note 251, § 2.27. 
272. /d. 
273. /d. § 2.9 (stating that "a practitioner can never with great safety counsel a 
client to appear at any kind of agency proceeding unrepresented. 
However, financial realities may compel this"). 
274. /d. 
275. See id. § 2.32 (noting that when an appeal is filed to an ALJ's order under 
the MCHR, before the case can reach the circuit court, there is a 
committee that serves as an intermediate step). 
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also make sure that all administrative remedies are exhausted before 
an appeal becomes available.276 These benefits under the Maryland 
administrative process may present a viable alternative even for those 
individuals who can still sue and recover under the ADA. Overall, the 
Maryland administrative process provides a valid and appealing 
alternative for those who cannot seek protection in court under the 
ADA. 
2. Maryland Commission on Human Relations 
The desire to create judicial economy and a forum that helps move 
claims through to a swift and fair resolution makes the Maryland 
system alluring, but in comparison to the remedies available under 
the ADA, Article 49B falls short.277 However, Article 49B does provide 
enough relief to "make whole"278 the aggrieved party.279 
a. Equitable Relief 
The hearing examiner in the MCHR has several forms of relief 
available to award the plaintiff if the examiner concludes that the state 
employer committed an unlawful employment act and discriminated 
based on an individual's disability. 28° First, the hearing examiner may 
issue a cease and desist order to immediately stop the employer from 
continuing its harmful actions. 281 Second, if the state is found to have 
committed the alleged unlawful employment practice, the MCHR can 
provide multiple remedies. 282 A remedy may include reinstating the 
employee, hiring of the disabled individual with the possibility of 
granting back pay, providing any equitable relief that the hearing 
examiner deems necessary, or combining any of these remedies. 283 In 
Martin Marietta Cmp., Aero & Naval Systems v. Maryland Commission on 
Human Relations,284 the Fourth Circuit held that under Article 49B 










See id. § 2.33 ("Statutorily prescribed administrative remedies, including 
administrative levels of appeal, must ordinarily be pursued and exhausted 
before you can file a petition for judicial review."). 
See, e.g., STANLEY MAzARoFF, MARYlAND EMPLOYMENT LAw § 7.12 (2d ed. 
2001) ("Federal equal opportunity laws differ with regard to the relief 
available to a victim of discrimination, and they differ as well with the relief 
available under their primary State counterpart, Article 49B. "). 
See id. (noting that employment discrimination laws exist so "the victim of 
the discrimination should be placed in the same position he would have 
been but for the act of discrimination"). 
Martin Marietta Carp., 38 F.3d at 1403 (noting that through Article 49B, "the 
MCHR possesses broad powers to issue a consensual order requiring an 
employer to eliminate discrimination and reinstate an employee ... "). 
See Mo. ANN. ConE art. 49B § ll(e). 
/d. 
See infra Part IV.B.2.b, C. 
See infra Part IV.B.2.b. 
38 F.3d 1392 (4th Cir. 1994). 
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requmng an employer to eliminate discrimination and reinstate an 
employee, and to award further equitable relief."285 
b. Monetary Relief 
The MCHR most importantly has the option to provide monetary 
relief.286 Maryland has allowed monetary relief under the Maryland 
Code since 1977,287 but this authority is not as extensive as the 
remedial powers that courts have with the ADA. Under the ADA, a 
court may award both punitive and compensatory damages, 288 which 
are two remedies that are unavailable under Article 49B. 289 Before 
the Supreme Court held Congress' abrogation of the states' Eleventh 
Amendment immunity unconstitutional,290 Article 49B was not 
intended to serve as "an exclusive state remedy for such 
discrimination. "291 However, after Garrett, for state employees seeking 
redress for disability discrimination, the only relief they may be able to 
seek is through the law of Maryland. The Maryland General Assembly 
needs to amend Article 49B to include punitive and compensatory 
damages, and make its law as appealing as the ADA by affording state 
employees in Maryland the same protection under state law that all 
other employees are afforded under the ADA. 
3. Reasonable Accommodation 
Like the ADA, Article 49B also requires an employer to provide 
"reasonable accommodation" for disabled employees in the 









!d. at 1403. See Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 316 Md. 603, 623, 561 A.2d 
179, 189 (1989); Univ. of Md. at Bait. v. Boyd, 93 Md. App. 303, 309, 612 
A.2d 305, 311 (1992). 
See Mo. ANN. ConE art. 49B § 11 (e); see also Chekey v. BTR Realty, Inc., 575 
F. Supp. 715, 716 (D. Md. 1983) ("The Maryland Human Relations 
Commission is empowered under the statute to award monetary relief for 
violations thereof."). 
Mo. ANN. ConE art. 49B § ll(f). 
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a(a)(2) (West 1994). Under "Section 102 of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ... [t]he complaining party may 
recover compensatory and punitive damages .... " Id. But see 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1981a(b) (noting that plaintiffs who sue under the ADA are limited by 
caps on compensatory and punitive damages). 
See MAzAROFF, supra note 277, § 7.12. 
See supra note 208 and accompanying text (discussing the holding in 
Garrett). 
See Kohler, 914 F. Supp. at 1211. 
See Mo. ANN. ConE art. 49B § 16(a); Garrett, 531 U.S. at 361 (noting that the 
ADA requires the employer to provide reasonable accommodations to 
'"mak[e] existing facilities used by the employees readily accessible to and 
usable by individuals with disabilities"' (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(5)(B) 
(2000)). It is discrimination for an employer to deny "employment 
opportunities to a job applicant or employee who is an otherwise qualified 
individual with a disability, if such denial is based on the need of such 
covered entity to make reasonable accommodation to the physical or 
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require employers to take this extra step, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland has interpreted the law as requiring employers to 
"reasonably accommodate" disabled employees.293 An employer 
"reasonably accommodates" if it satisfies two elements.294 First, an 
employer must make the workplace accessible to an individual with 
disabilities.295 Second, an employer must reasonably provide the 
disabled employee a restructured job, or flexible work schedule.296 
Those individuals who want to hold the state accountable for its 
disability discrimination have comparable protection under Maryland 
state law, with the exception of slightly limited remedies, as they 
would under the ADA, 297 and the administrative forum may provide 
an appealing alternative to the burdensome procedures of bringing a 
claim in federal court. 298 
4. Other Remedies 
In addition to suing the state under state law, there are other 
avenues of recourse that a disabled individual may take.299 In Garrett, 
the majority noted that the holding did not totally prohibit individuals 
from taking action against the state under the ADA.300 
mental impairments of the employee or applicant." Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12111(9): 
I d. 
The term "reasonable accommodation" may include -
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible 
to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and 
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, 
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification 
of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or 
modification of examinations, training materials or policies, 
the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other 
similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities. 
293. See Martin Marietta Corp., 38 F.3d at 1398-99. 
294. Id. at 1398-99 n.4. 
295. Id.; see also EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 2000). 
The court stated that "[reasonable] accommodations can take various 
forms, such as making the workplace accessible to a person who is 
wheelchair bound, or, of particular pertinence here, 'reassignment [of the 
disabled person] to a vacant position.'" !d. at 1026 (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 12111(9)(B)). 
296. Martin Marietta Corp., 38 F.3d at 1398-99 n.4. But see Olmstead v. L.C., 527 
U.S. 581 (1999). The Court stated that "'[a] public entity shall make 
reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the 
modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of 
disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the 
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, 
program, or activity.'" !d. at 592 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) 
(1998)) 0 
297. See supra Part IV.B.2.a. 
298. See supra notes 267-72 and accompanying text. 
299. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9. 
300. See infra Part IV.C.1-3. 
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a. Actions Against Local Governments 
First, in Garrett, the Supreme Court concluded that smaller 
government entities within the state do not receive immunity from the 
Eleventh Amendment under the ADA.301 While cities and states are 
considered "state actors" and held to abide by the Fourteenth 
Amendment,302 "only states are beneficiaries of the Eleventh 
Amendment."303 Therefore, the Eleventh Amendment does not apply 
to local governments, and "[t]hese entities are subject to private 
claims for damages under the ADA without Congress' ever having to 
rely on [Section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment .... "304 However, 
this exception does not apply if the local entity "is an arm of the 
state."305 If the exception does not apply, and a city or county 
employer discriminates on the basis of disability, then an individual 
may still seek damages under the ADA. 306 
b. Injunctive Relief 
A state employee can no longer use the ADA to sue the state for 
money damages in federal court, 307 but there are other forms of 
recourse for state employees under the ADA.308 Another alternative 
to suing the state under state law is to have private individuals seek 
injunctive relief against the state. 309 When state employees are barred 
by the Eleventh Amendment from seeking money damages, they may 
still file a claim with the EEOC to get an injunction, but their focus 
must turn from suing the State of Maryland to suing a state official 
who discriminated against the claimant when acting in his or her 
official capacity. 310 
c. ADA Enforcement Through the Department of justice 
The third way to sue under the ADA and avoid state law is to have 
the United States, through the Department of Justice (DOJ), enforce 















Helen IIvin, EEOC Will Still Investigate Charges After Garrett, Memo Tells Field 
Offices, DAILY LABoR REPORT, Nov. 20, 2001, at 11 ("Whether a local 
government entity has [Eleventh] Amendment immunity must be 
determined on a case-by-case basis and depends on state law .... "). 
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 369. 
!d. at 360 (noting the Court's holding); see also supra note 209 and 
accompanying text. 
See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9 ("Our holding here that Congress did not 
validly abrogate the States' sovereign immunity from suit by private 
individuals for money damages under Title I does not mean that persons 
with disabilities have no federal recourse against discrimination."). 
!d.; see also Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
Irvin, supra note 305, at 10. 
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plaintiff.311 Suing through the United States and the DOJ still allows 
for the recovery of money damages.312 In the aftermath of Garrett, the 
EEOC sent a memo advising its field offices to pursue this avenue and 
continue their investigation of valid claims of disability discrimination 
by state employers against state employees.313 While this memo raises 
hope for individuals with disabilities who are aggrieved by the State of 
Maryland, they should not rely on the DOJ to take their case because 
this agency rarely sues the states.314 Donald R. Livingston, a former 
general counsel for the EEOC, stated that "'[t]he states have had little 
to fear from litigation by the federal government.' "315 
C. Federal Attempts to Aid State Employees Under the ADA 
While the Supreme Court invalidated Congress' abrogation of the 
states' sovereign immunity, the ADA may once again control 
employment discrimination litigation against the states if the states 
waive their rights under the Eleventh Amendment.316 However, as of 
the writing of this Comment, only Minnesota has taken this step,317 
and it is difficult to predict whether other states will follow 
Minnesota's lead.318 To have other states follow Minnesota's example, 
several politicians have proposed ways to entice the states to waive 
their Eleventh Amendment immunity. 
Senator Edward Kennedy believes that "the only way to provide 
adequate protection for the right to be free from age [and disability] 
discrimination is to give the employee the right to sue an employer in 
court for discrimination."319 Both Senator Kennedy and Senator Jim 
Jeffords have introduced a proposal that would allow state employees 
to sue the state under the ADEA, 320 and could propose a similar bill 
for the ADA.321 Because Congress cannot provide a statutory remedy 
311. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9. 
312. ld. 
313. Irvin, supra note 305, at 10 (noting that the EEOC wants its field offices to 
"continue to coordinate charges that have 'litigation potential' with the 
Department of Justice"); id. at 12 (noting that the EEOC can conduct an 
investigation and push for mediation, but it cannot sue the states itself 




317. Id. at 11-12. 
318. ld. at 13 (quoting Donald Livingston who stated that "'I suppose no one 
knows whether other states will follow the example of Minnesota and waive 
their sovereign immunity under the ADA'"). 
319. 69 U.S.L.W. 2156, 2157 (2000). 
320. Id. at 2156. 
321. !d. (noting that before Garrett was decided, Senator Kennedy believed that 
the Supreme Court would preserve an aggrieved party's ability to sue a state 
under the ADA and that no legislation would be necessary, but after Garrett, 
one could infer that he may want to extend the proposed legislation to 
apply to the ADA). 
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against the states for discriminating against individuals with disabilities 
in their employment practices without the states consenting to expose 
themselves to suit, these Senators might have to entice the states to 
relinquish their Eleventh Amendment immunity with these 
regulations. 322 They have proposed a bill that would allow the states 
to receive federal financial assistance in return for the states' waiver of 
their sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.323 
IV. CONCLUSION SHOULD THIS BE "V."? 
With the reemergence of the Eleventh Amendment, federalism has 
once again become a strong force in our national jurisprudence.324 
For the past few years, the United States Supreme Court has limited 
Congress' Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment powers to 
legislate, because these laws unconstitutionally abrogated the states' 
Eleventh Amendment rights.325 The infringement on state 
sovereignty has led the Court to restrict the provisions of federal 
legislation that allow private individuals to sue the state for money 
damages in federal court.326 The ADA is the latest legislation affected 
by this movement. 327 
In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 328 the 
Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred Congress 
from allowing private suits against the states for money damages 
under the ADA.329 According to the Court's majority, no widespread 
evidence of the states discriminating against individuals existed to 
justify Congress' assertion of federal paternalism.330 While few can 
discredit the importance of the ADA,331 the legislation's social value 
cannot outweigh the necessity of respecting the states as co-equal 
sovereigns. 332 The Court prohibited suits against states for damages 
under the ADA while directing the aggrieved to state law. 333 
Maryland law offers protection comparable with the ADA. 334 Most 
importantly, Maryland law covers those that, after Garrett, are left 
322. Id. 
323. ld.; see also Helen Irvin, California Waived 11th Amendment Immunity to Rehab 
Act Claims by Taking Federal Funds, DAILY LABoR REPORT, Nov. 19, 2001, at 5 
(noting that a debate is brewing in the circuits over whether Rehabilitation 
Act claims might have survived Garrett and whether states have waived their 
Eleventh Amendment immunity "by accepting Rehabilitation Act funds"). 
324. See supra Part II. 
325. See supra Part II.A. 
326. See supra Part II.B. 
327. See supra Part III.B. 
328. 531 u.s. 356 (2001). 
329. See supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text. 
330. See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text. 
331. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text. 
332. See supra note 208 and accompanying text. 
333. See supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text. 
334. See supra Part IV.B.2, C. 
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without federal recourse by allowing individuals to sue the state for 
equitable relief.335 However, two mcyor differences exist between 
seeking recourse under the ADA and Article 49B. 
First, Article 49B does not authorize all of the same remedies as the 
ADA.336 Most notably, under Maryland law, an aggrieved party cannot 
receive compensatory or punitive damages.337 The inequality between 
the two remedies calls for the Maryland General Assembly to amend 
Article 49B so that state employees who are victims of disability 
discrimination may be "made whole" to the same extent as someone 
who has brought a suit under the ADA. 
Second, under Maryland's legislation, one must first go through an 
agency rather than bring a suit in court.338 This difference has been 
criticized as to the adequacy of Maryland's remedy as compared to the 
ADA.339 The United States District Court for the District of Maryland 
found that "Maryland's administrative proceeding is designed 
primarily to 'eliminate the discrimination by conference, conciliation 
and persuasion."'340 However, this court believes that this quick fix 
does not protect an individual's rights as well as the ADA.341 
The Maryland system may not have procedural pomp and 
circumstance such as filing and pursuing a claim through federal 
court under the ADA, but it does have some appeat.342 First, the state 
administrative system does not deprive individuals of their due 
process rights. 343 Second, arguing before an ALJ offers a more 
informal setting that will cost less then filing a claim in federal 
court.344 
While the Supreme Court has recently reestablished the Eleventh 
Amendment and struck down provisions of federal statutes that 
unconstitutionally abrogate state sovereignty,345 it more significantly 
appears to be directing Congress to respect federalism. Situations 
exist where Congress has the ability under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment 
immunity, 346 but this power is not infinite in establishing social 
reform.347 With disability discrimination, every state has already 
335. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
336. See supra notes 286-89 and accompanying text. 
337. See supra note 289 and accompanying text. 
338. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
339. See Kohler v. Shenasky, 914 F. Supp. 1206, 1210 n.4 (D. Md. 1995). 
340. See id. (quoting McNutt v. Duke Precision Dental & Orthodontic Lab., 698 
F.2d 676, 679 (4th Cir. 1983)). 
341. See id. at 1210. 
342. See supra Part IV.B.l. 
343. See supra note 264 and accompanying text. 
344. See supra notes 261-72 and accompanying text. 
345. See supra Parts II, III.B.2. 
346. See supra notes 194-202 and accompanying text. 
34 7. See supra Part II. 
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enacted legislation to curb this problem,348 but because Congress did 
not see this as sufficient, it intentionally abrogated the Eleventh 
Amendment although the states already regulated themselves. 349 
Congress must respect federalism, the concept that our Founding 
Fathers built our nation upon. The Court has held, and may continue 
to hold, that "[a]lthough the Constitution grants broad powers to 
Congress, our federalism requires that Congress treat the States in a 
manner consistent with their status as residuary sovereigns and joint 
participants in the governance of the Nation."350 
Geoffrey G. Hengerer 
348. See supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
349. See supra note 210 and accompanying text; see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 12202 
(1995): 
!d. 
A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State 
court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter. In 
any action against a State for a violation of the requirements of this 
chapter, remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) 
are available for such a violation to the same extent as such 
remedies are available in an action against any public or private 
entity other than a State. 
350. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999). 
